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I. Introduction 
 
Microfinance is one of the most important economic phenomena since the advent of capitalism 
and Adam Smith.  
(Vinod Khosla, Silicon Valley venture capitalist, 20041) 
 
 
 In the discourse of development – where everyone professes a will to improve the status 
quo – poverty remains an insoluble problem. Originally, the project of international development 
was inaugurated by U.S. President Harry Truman during the time of embedded liberalism and 
Keynesian economics after the Second World War. Development consisted of economic policies 
designed to assist poor nations and reduce global inequality by increasing the flow of aid from 
the Global North to the Global South. In the 21st century, however, the goals, purpose and 
methods of development have shifted from their earlier iterations. Rather than empowering 
national economies in the developing world, millennial development now aims to alleviate 
poverty as its first priority, taking as its guiding framework of metrics the Millennium 
Development Goals adopted by the United Nations. Books like the economist Jeffrey Sachs’ The 
End of Poverty: Economic Possibilities for Our Time2 and humanitarian rock stars like Bono 
from U23 now herald anti-poverty campaigns as the goal and responsibility that industrialized 
societies have towards their non-industrialized counterparts.  
 During the 1980s, industrial development came to be associated with policies centered on 
the international financial institutions – the International Monetary Fund, World Bank and Bank 
of International Settlements – that actively promoted the privatization, deregulation and 
liberalization of world markets and became known as “The Washington Consensus.” Yet, after 
consecutive financial crises like the 1982 Latin American Debt Crisis and the 1997 Asian 
Financial Crisis,4 other alternatives were considered by policymakers to replace the ineffective 
and discredited policies of the Washington Consensus. To solve this crisis of credibility in 
development circles, policymakers sought a concept that resonated with the poor and powerless. 
One manifestation of this was the financial instrument known hereafter as “microfinance.” Its 
pro-poor and participatory policies were considered just, effective and a new paradigm for 
development that reversed the failures of its 20th century predecessor. Microfinance represented a 
rupture with the past.  
From its inception, microfinance was designed to provide financial services to the poor. It 
operates under the logic that lending small amounts to the poorest of the poor is a viable solution 
to eradicate poverty. Its founder, the Bangladeshi economist Muhammed Yunus, a self-anointed 
“Banker to the Poor,”5 made as his point of departure the premise that “poverty is the absence of 
all human rights.”6 Yunus’ innovative vision targeted not only the poor, but lowest stratum of the 
poor. More than any other downtrodden group, Yunus sought with microfinance to assist and 
empower women.  
Conceptually, microfinance rests its assumptions on the attractive entrepreneurial spirit of 
individuals. Unlike other policies seeking to alleviate poverty, it does not depend on a faceless 
mass of bureaucrats with no connection to their recipients. Thus microfinance does not rely on 
development aid or public spending. Rather, it focuses on bringing the borrowing institution and 
the lender into a relationship that excludes the state or any intermediary agent or institution. In 
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this respect, microfinance is consistent with the millennial goal of poverty eradication through its 
pronounced distance from notions of economic growth in developing nations.   
However, despite its lofty aspirations and innovative approach, a critical examination of 
microfinance reveals that microfinancial institutions comprise a profitable industry with ties and 
links to international finance and the unpopular institutions it claims to replace. While 
microfinance finds appeal by promoting democracy, strengthening social capital ties and 
broadening human capital networks, it has also become an exploitative constellation of 
institutions that leave those they claim to help in worse conditions than they were originally. By 
targeting women primarily, microfinancial institutions claim to empower the most vulnerable 
sectors of society. By promoting communitarian networks and greater interconnection in civil 
society, microfinancial institutions also claim to fortify the glue that holds societies together. 
And by encouraging participatory systems of voting and representation, microfinancial 
institutions claim to be leading developing countries into new frontiers of democratic 
industrialization. Yet the thousands of women who have partaken in microfinancial initiatives 
have now been victims of predatory lending schemes with exorbitant interest rates that are 
beyond their abilities of re-payment.  
This article explains how microfinance, an industry embedded in the financialization of 
development, is now concerned with high financial returns for investments, not the social goals 
promised by its original raison d'être. It asks two fundamental questions about its concepts and 
practices. First, what is microfinance supposed to do? Answering this question requires a broad 
examination of the various financial services that are furnished by microfinancial institutions 
(MFIs), including micro-lending, savings, remittances, micro-insurance and, in the case of Haiti, 
promoting participatory democracy, social capital and human capital. Moreover, microfinance 
relies on two different logics of democracy and social capital versus profitability and financial 
sustainability for investors. If these two logics are contradictory or mutually exclusive, how can 
these logics enter into conversation with one another for microfinance to sustain its credibility 
and continue to exist? My argument is that there is a fundamental tension between the short-term 
social goals promised by microfinance and the long-term financial objectives of sustainability of 
investors. Because microfinance no longer serves as a tool to eradicate poverty but also for 
greater investments and profitability, microfinancial institutions use discourses of democracy, 
social capital, human capital and empowerment to sustain their financial practices and continue 
bringing the poor into its bankable sectors. By incorporating new borrowers into capital markets 
that exceed local or national boundaries, microfinancial subjects become dependent to the same 
institutions that claim to free them from poverty and social exclusion. It is this fundamental 
tension between these contradictory logics that animates my argument.  
Methodologically, I use the discourse analysis method of qualitative research employed 
forcefully by the philosopher Michel Foucault in his books and lectures. Foucault starts from the 
premise that discourse is a set of language practices, debates and incitements that require us to 
choose particular textual representations in particular instances. Foucault also considered every 
act to be embedded in a network of material practices; he rejected the traditional dichotomy 
made between ideational factors and material factors by arguing that they are deeply imbricated 
in each other. A discourse analysis requires identifying the historical conditions of possibility 
under which a phenomenon in question comes to the fore. Additionally, discourse analysis 
examines the various ways that discourse operates: first, by identifying the logic of the argument 
in the text and examining how the concepts are related to one another; second, by understanding 
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its effects, implications and ramifications. I also use Foucault’s concept of “governmentality” 
introduced during his lectures at the Collège de France to understand new forms of governing 
that are traditionally emanating from the state. I use his concept of governmentality to illustrate 
how the recipients of microcredit are governed through new technologies of government that 
create, arrange and reconfigure subjects in developing countries. 
As my case study, I examine a Caribbean country in the western hemisphere with a 
chronic history of poverty and scarcity: Haiti. Faced with an earthquake with enormous 
devastating consequences, the poorest nation in the western hemisphere is now a primal site for 
microfinancial initiatives and growing scales of privatization schemes. Taking Haiti as an 
empirical account, this article seeks to explain how the financialization of microfinance can be 
seen as a new form of governmentality - embodied by the constellation of the Haitian state, 
microfinancial institutions and international financial markets - aimed to create new subjects and 
produce discursive knowledge about them. 
Using the interpretive methods of critical discourse analysis, I examined primary 
documents produced and disseminated by institutions concerned with microfinancial 
development, including international financial institutions (The World Bank, GCAP), 
microfinancial institutions (Fonkoze, SOGESOL, Finca Haiti, BRAC development, Institute of 
Development), and philanthropic organizations whose funds are channeled to smaller NGOs 
operating on the ground (Clinton Global Initiative, Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation). I browsed 
a diverse collection of texts: from their mission statements and annual reports to articles and blog 
entries published on their websites. My objective is to discover, highlight and thematize how 
textual discursive practices allow us to understand the production of truth and power in 
microfinance. Drawing on the events in Haiti before and after the 2010 earthquake, this article 
explores how development projects such as microfinance produce knowledge about subjects in 
order to legitimize their practices.  
There has been a wide-range of critical theoretical literature that situates microfinance in 
broader systems of financialization and modes of governance. Political anthropologists and 
geographers such as Li, Escobar, Ferguson and Watts are critical of the different ways that 
development programs create new forms of governance worldwide.7 Weber has noted the double 
processes of financialization of microfinance are tied to the neoliberal programs of deregulation 
of finance and liberalization of trade.8 Aitken argues that microfinance is another facet of 
neoliberalism – a political rationality that prioritizes the market, seeks minimum state 
interference, based largely on risk assessment strategies and the unstoppable search for favorable 
business climates.9 For Delaney, microfinance serves as a set of technologies of power that 
increase state power through the market.10 Roy, on the other hand, draws on the work of the 
sociologist Pierre Bourdieu to postulate a new type of capital, “poverty capital,” referring to the 
effort made by financial institutions to capitalize on poverty. Poverty capital is engendered and 
circulated by international financial institutions and development agencies. Their aim is to profit 
from microfinance initiatives and to produce, circulate and regulate knowledge about the very 
poor and its most vulnerable members, including women and children.  
But how do the discourses of social and human capital interact with financial 
sustainability for investors? How do microfinancial institutions use these discourses to find 
appeal with investors while creating new markets and high margins of profitable success? One of 
the best ways to answer this question, I argue, is through the discourse analysis method that 
compares the statements and documents released by development agencies. The goal in mind is 
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to understand microfinance discourse as a form of governmentality that hides beneath its public 
narrative.  Foucault’s method of discourse analysis and his concept of governmentality describes 
this best, since governmentality is concerned with the “conduct of conducts” and “the diverse 
forms of practice requires to render objects governable in particular ways.”11 Whereas the term 
“governance” is usually conceptualized within a centered network of institutions, 
governmentality relates to the different ways that subjects come to govern themselves and others. 
"It seeks out an analysis of the diverse assemblages of knowledge and practice through which 
objects become governable in distinct ways.”12By employing these methods to textual analysis of 
development agencies in Haiti, my contribution to the literature is to extend and broaden the 
work done by critical development theorists on Haiti, investigate how these discourses operate in 
a post-natural disaster scenario, and understand how the two contradictory logics of microfinance 
operate at large. To that extent, the goal of my project is tease out the diverse and heterogeneous 
practices of governmentality that are seen through finance; the focus is on how knowledge of 
populations is a production of power, not simply on the material power as traditionally 
conceived.  
Drawing from the work of theorists like Roy, Delaney, Weber and Aitken, I agree with 
their assumption that microfinance has been financialized and offers financial services that are 
incongruent with the social goals that it had originally in mind. But whereas the literature on 
critical development studies centers around Africa or South Asia, my article focuses on Haiti, the 
poorest country in the Caribbean and the Western Hemisphere. Although theorists like Aitken 
have applied discourse analysis to Latin American countries like Mexico, no one has either 
worked on Haiti or any other country in the Caribbean. What makes Haiti a special case is that it 
was flooded with microfinancial institutions after the earthquake. Whereas Aitken focuses on the 
transformation of NGOs into commercial financial institutions, this article, on the other hand, 
centers on microfinance, particularly as it is concerned with Haiti as a primal site of post-disaster 
reconstruction. My contribution to the literature is to demonstrate that microfinance, as a method 
of development, is another example of governmentality in Haiti, a case study absent in this 
literature.  
 
II. The Origins and Logic of Microfinance  
Microfinance is defined as the extension of credit to small groups of poor populations to 
fund micro-enterprise activities of their own. First conceived by the Bangladeshi economist 
Muhammed Yunus and the bank he founded, the Grameen Bank, microfinance is unique because 
it promises to advance the economic interests of the poor by engaging them directly.13 Yunus has 
boldly declared that access to credit is a human right, and with microfinance he sees a unique 
vehicle for empowering the poor and their rights. According to the New York Times, “in the 
decades since Mr. Yunus' first loan, microcredit has become one of the most popular antipoverty 
strategies in the world."14  
The impact of microfinance can be gauged by the number of people who have in one way 
or another been affected by microfinance: In 2009, according to the Microfinance Summit 
Campaign, 128 million people worldwide received microfinance loans.15 The Grameen Bank, 
which employs 22,000 employees, has issued microcredit loans to 8.36 million people, of whom 
97% are women.16 With its universal promises to combat and eradicate poverty in the new 
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millennium, microfinance is deemed a panacea for poverty reduction and the most powerful 
alternative to state-led development, according to its most ardent advocates. It is a universal 
method, for it can be used anywhere, by anyone, at any time. Roy asserts that the “ubiquitous 
idea” of microfinance “is lauded and deployed by development institutions and theorists of all 
stripes and varying ideologies as an important antidote to poverty.”17 
 
A. The Discourse of Microfinance 
For close to 40 years, as microfinance surfaced and became the subject of praise and 
adulation by different institutions, it finally captured the public's imagination in the 1990s. As 
one analyst put it, "none of the ideas put forth has had greater appeal or more endurance than 
microfinance."18 In essence, the normative discourse of microfinance is imbued with a 
commitment to reduce poverty and empower women worldwide. As Dichter put it, 
"microfinance's anti-poverty promise can be stated in a couple of simple sentences: lend money 
to poor people who will invest in tiny businesses, and with their profits pay back the money and 
gradually rise out of poverty.”19 Similarly, Lewis T. Preston, former President of the World 
Bank, claimed that microfinance is “a particular way of reaching women, thereby helping to 
improve the incomes and well-being of their children and families.” 20 Despite its irresistible 
appeal, microfinance received an unprecedented degree of attention in 2006 when Muhammed 
Yunus received the Nobel Peace Prize for his creation and influence of the Grameen Bank. 
“Microcredit has proved to be an important liberating force in societies where women in 
particular have to struggle against repressive social and economic conditions,” declared the 
committee upon the prize announcement.21 The result of this discourse of empowerment has 
been the legitimization of the role of the MFIs in their objectives of poverty reduction. 
At the most fundamental level, microcredit is defined as the provision of small loans to 
individuals in order to escape poverty, generate their own means of income, and empower 
themselves and the groups they belong to. In general, in addition to providing access to credit, it 
also provides microfinancial services such as options for insurance schemes or opportunities to 
save that enhance microcredit programs.22 The Grameen Bank has been considered an epitome of 
microcredit minimalism, or the practice of issuing credit without demanding training obligations, 
skills requirements or any conventional type of collateral from the borrower.23 By providing 
credit directly to the poor, microfinance supersedes the state as an intermediary between rural 
households and international financial markets. This increasing role of eliminating the distance 
between microlending agencies and its recipients is seen as one of the prime benefits of 
microfinance as an alternative to other development practices.24 Advocates of microfinance also 
contend that it may also contribute to the accumulation of assets, reduce vulnerabilities due to 
illness, and contribute to better education.25  
But the debate is far from settled on whether or not microfinance has been an effective 
and sustainable tool for poverty reduction. Different studies have yielded different results in 
different parts of the world. A 2009 study conducted by the MIT Poverty Action Lab study in 
India showed that microfinance has not had a direct impact or effect on reducing poverty or 
economic growth.26 Another study made in Bangladesh found an insignificant impact on the 
levels of household consumption before or after the presence of microcredit programs.27  
Similarly, a report issued by the UK Department for International Development asserted that “no 
clear evidence exists that microfinance programmes [sic] have positive impacts,” concluding that 
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“microfinance has to be combined with other interventions.”28 Critics also claim that 
microfinance is exclusionary of the poorest of the poor - they point to studies that have found 
that it is the “better off” poor rather than the lowest rungs of the poor who benefit from access to 
microfinance. 29 Others observe that supply-driven micro-credit initiatives ignore the “informal 
finance” practices that the poor resort for their needs. In some cases, recipients use their loans for 
emergencies or social traditions instead of entrepreneurial activities. Hence analysts point that, 
instead of using micro-loans to generate income, micro-credit borrowers have used their loan 
money for “cushioning effects” and “consumption soothing.”30  
Notwithstanding its failures, nowhere is the current crisis of microfinance starker than in 
its unintended consequences. Analysts say it is impossible to ignore the skyrocketing number of 
clients defaulting on their loans and the growing rates of drop-outs.31 Even in those countries 
where there's been a rise of microfinance, researchers have observed additional patterns of 
delinquency and multiple sources of borrowing by recipients.32 Global institutions like the 
International Labor Organization (ILO) now consider that microfinance is an insufficient tool to 
combat poverty, arguing that policies that insure farmers against natural disasters are also 
necessary.33 The number of success stories are becoming fewer and rarer. "On current evidence,” 
writes a senior fellow at the Center for Global Development in Washington, “the best estimate of 
the average impact of microcredit on the poverty of clients is zero." 34  As Hermes and 
Lensik put it, “even though several assessments of the impact of microfinance on poverty 
reduction have been made, there is surprisingly little solid empirical evidence on this issue.”35 To 
that extent, I am not interested in examining whether microfinance is an effective tool for 
economic development or whether is sustainable in the long-run. The question I would like to 
pose is different: How does the discourse of microfinancial development differ from that of its 
borrowers to that of its recipients?   
 
B. The Financialization of Microfinance 
Originally, when microfinance was first conceived, it was a visionary and 
groundbreaking project. In the last two decades, however, microfinance has been absorbed by 
financial industries and become a practice for capital accumulation. Rather than interpreting it as 
just another, innovative paradigm of development, we can now speak of microfinance as an 
unbridled global industry, one where debt is the ultimate goal: 
 
It is no longer enough then to talk about microfinance as a sector of development. Rather it is 
essential to talk about it as a industry where the commodity that is being produced, traded, 
and valued is debt.36  
 
Although international financial markets usually stand in contrast to the discourse of aid and 
development, microfinance has increasingly been linked with the deregulation of financial 
markets worldwide. Microfinance is now associated with the structural adjustment efforts of 
neoliberal institutions like the IMF and the World Bank. In this context, the financialization of 
microfinance refers to the unprecedented rise in financial practices that are now part of its 
lending efforts. As Aitken put it, "financialization has come to refer to the increasing prominence 
of financial calculations, practices and identities in domains previously governed in the name of 
other kinds of logics, including, recently, the realm of microfinance.”37 For example, the 
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Mexican microfinance initiative Compartamos makes a yearly profit of $80 million by lending to 
1 million women at interest rates reaching a 90 percent threshold. Whereas the “financial 
systems approach” to microfinance emphasizes MFI sustainability over outreach and poverty-
reduction, the “poverty lending approach” emphasizes poverty reduction by providing credit with 
subsidized interest rates.  Over the last two decades, the financial systems approach has 
prevailed, since MFI sustainability is now prioritized over effective outreach.  
One of the promises of microfinance is to incorporate the poorest elements of society into 
the economic fabric of developing countries. This level of incorporation relates to the financial 
inclusion of those who have been traditionally excluded from access to mainstream financial 
institutions. Financial inclusion brings microfinancial institutions - including NGOs, who 
become financial intermediaries - closer together with its borrowers. But what seems like a pro-
poor initiative with positive social results may just be a veneer for the reproduction of capital 
accumulation. In her analysis of how this process of inclusion works, Aitken notes that a set of 
differentiated interest rates, sometimes including up to 30% to 50%, are charged to large groups 
of populations that cannot afford these credit loans.38 Behind the hidden truths of microfinance, 
the poverty reduction agenda is turned upside down. Financial norms, once the anathema of 
development, take the place of social norms. Moreover, the empowerment of women promised 
by microfinance stands in murky waters and tides of uncertainty. For all the improvements that 
microfinance is credited with, the empowerment of women is now highly debatable. Growing 
numbers of women worldwide face crises of debt and are unable to maintain any durable savings 
accounts, some going as far as committing suicide in the face of social opprobrium and personal 
cycles of depression. Empowerment, to that extent, is now an empty signifier that is freely used 
by development agencies in exercises of self-appraisal, without even considering its 
depoliticizing consequences.  
In the next section, I will explain how a discourse analysis can be a useful tool to 
understand how the two contradictory logics of democracy and human capital contradict with the 
need to attain financial and efficient markets by investors. However, before explaining my 
methodology, it is important to note that my discourse analysis is centered on one country: Haiti.  
 
III. Methodology 
 
A. Case Selection 
  
To fully capture the history of development in Haiti, it is vital to examine the historical 
legacy of colonialism and perpetual debt. In 1804, Haiti became the first successful slave 
rebellion in world history. Its independence marked a radical departure from centuries of 
colonialism under Spanish and later French rule in the Caribbean. Located in the island of 
Hispaniola, Haiti was the most profitable colony of the French, surpassing all other colonies in 
its production of sugar and coffee.  In 1825, France demanded “reparations” for property damage 
incurred during the 1804 revolution. The French threatened to invade Haiti if the latter did not 
fulfill its reparations obligations. In what may be considered one of the first examples of 
“structural adjustment” in modern history, Haiti had to borrow cash to repay this debt, which was 
bound by the constraints of the French. After the 120  years, Haiti finally repaid its debt of 150 
million francs, the modern equivalent of $21 billion.  
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 Through the “structural adjustments programs” that Haiti acceded to during the late 
1980s and 1990s, Haiti’s history has been characterized by unabated debt and political turmoil. 
With a population of 10 million inhabitants, Haiti has a current GDP per capita rate of $771 in 
U.S. Dollars, with 80% of the population living on less than $2 a day.39 In January 2010, Haiti 
was struck by a 7.0 magnitude earthquake that further devastated its economy and wrought a 
severe human toll, with estimates of approximately 316,000 deaths as a result of the 
earthquake.40 In economic terms, he earthquake resulted in a 9% economic contraction, and the 
loss of decades of work by NGOs operating on the ground.  
As Haitians continue to recover from the damages of the earthquake, another reckoning 
force continues to take a severe human toll on Haitians: the cholera epidemic that has spread 
throughout the country. One of the most enduring consequences of the earthquake has been its 
horrific effects on the fragile infrastructure of water, sanitation and public health.41 The first 
documented case of cholera occurred in October 2010 – only nine months after the earthquake. 
After extensive medical research, repeated tests showed that cholera was introduced by UN 
peacekeepers from Nepal, where cholera is endemic. Since the first case was reported two years 
ago, the disease has spread unrelentingly, and the consequences have been catastrophic: 500,000 
Haitians have been sickened, while over 7,000 have died. To the extent cholera has spread, the 
problem must be assessed systemically: the lack of proper water and sanitation systems in Haiti 
has exacerbated the situation.42  
Given the scope of the devastation in Haiti and the continuing cholera epidemic, Haiti is a 
case study that should be not ignored. Whereas previous analysts have focused on other regions 
(Africa and Asia) or other countries in Latin America (Mexico and Peru), Haiti and the 
Caribbean have been prominently ignored. It is in this context that I consider an investigation of 
microfinance in Haiti important for analysis. But before undertaking a discourse analysis, it is 
important to describe what it is and how it differs from other methods in the qualitative research 
in the social sciences.  
 
B. Discourse Analysis and Governmentality 
A discourse analysis of microfinance, as an analytical tool, has the potential to 
demonstrate how borrowers of microcredit are now subjects governed by development and 
financial institutions. The method of critical discourse analysis championed by Foucault begins 
with the assumption that issues of power mask themselves at a superficial level. Unlike social 
psychologists or linguists, critical discourse analysts understand their project as fundamentally 
political. 
 
Critical Discourse analysts…analyze texts from a political perspective. Because they argue that 
language is a central vehicle in the process whereby people are constituted as individuals and as 
social subjects, and because language and ideology are closely imbricated, the close systematic 
analysis of the language of texts can expels some of the workings of texts and, by extension, the 
way that people are oppressed within current social structures. They integrate post-structuralist 
questions of power, truth and knowledge and Marxist concerns with inequality and oppression 
with their linguistic analytical methods.43 
 
A discourse analysis therefore identifies the historical conditions of possibility under 
which the phenomenon in question comes to the fore to understand how discourse works. The 
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effects and implication are therefore critical to understand the effects of a discourse on ways of 
thinking. But to understand its repercussions it is important to remember the conceptual meaning 
of governmentality. In his 1978 set of lectures Security, Territory, Population at the College de 
France, Foucault penned the term "governmentality" to refer to what he calls "the art of 
governing." Foucault defines governmentality as 
 
   The ensemble formed by institutions, procures, analyses and reflections, calculations, and 
tactics that allow the exercise of this very specific, albeit very complex, power that has 
the population as its target, political economy as its major form of knowledge, and 
apparatuses of security as its essential technical instrument.44 
 
 In contextualizing his lecture within the history of sovereignty, Foucault sees 
governmentality, following La Perriére, as the "right disposition of things that one arranges so as 
to lead them to a suitable end.” In order to govern the subjects within a territory, one needs to 
arrange them spatially in certain ways that allow the state to have knowledge over them. For 
Foucault, however, this governmentalization of the state is best understood within the context of 
legitimacy and sovereignty in the history of Western political philosophy.  
In the world of microfinance, we can see this "ensemble" created and sustained by a 
constellation of international financial institutions, microfinancial institutions and NGOs that 
operate with the same objective in mind. It arranges its subjects and absorbs them into its rule. 
Perhaps more importantly, it renders them dependable on access to microcredit. Their 
arrangement, which includes ways to govern these subjects as a population, is different from 
those whose access to credit does not require microfinancial institutions. Whether as part of the 
World Bank or not, these institutions use methods to calculate the best strategies and tactics to 
lend micro capital and gain knowledge about the poor. Unlike Roy and others, who have 
examined microfinance as merely a new technology of government, I use the method of 
discourse analysis to understand how microfinance can continue to find so much appeal both to 
its borrowers and to those elite institutions that it continues receiving support. In her work, Roy 
did not evaluate the importance of using the discourses of human capital and social capital to 
create a logic of democratization that hides the basic elements of microfinance. Although the 
financialization of microfinance has received ample coverage in recent years, microfinancial 
institutions continue emphasizing its democratic potentials to hide or omit the effects that 
financialization has on its clients. It is this fundamental opposition between these two logics that 
I’m concerned with exploring using a discourse analysis.  
 
IV. The Reality of Microfinance in Haiti 
Given the detrimental state of public health and deteriorating conditions of poverty, there 
is an active presence of development NGOs and institutions in the country. To do a discourse 
analysis of microfinancial institutions in Haiti, it is important to recall the institutions that are 
operating on the ground. Not all NGOs are funded by the same Northern philanthropic 
institutions; therefore, not all organizations have the same amount of resources at their disposal. I 
read the statements and reports issued by the following NGOs: ACME, Finca-HTI, Fondespor, 
Fonkoze, Fonkoze Financial Services (SFF), IDM, MCN and SOGESOL. I also examined the 
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press releases, reports and statements released by the philanthropic institutions such as the 
Clinton Global Initiative, the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, the Institute of Development 
Studies, and the BRAC Development Institute. Lastly, I read the literature released by financial 
institutions like the Consultative Group to Assist the Poor and the World Bank.  
Similar to other how microfinance operates in other countries, microfinancial institutions 
have capitalized on the number of borrowers that have become immediately “bankable” in Haiti. 
In the same way that Mexican MFIs have lent at rates unimaginable to their clients, the reality of 
microfinance in Haiti is that these loans exceed what clients can afford and make use of. Indeed, 
when borrowers were approved to receive microcredit loans, the interest rates have ranged 
between 30% to 55%. One the one hand, organizations like Fonkoze proclaim in their mission 
statement to seek “building the economic foundations for democracy in Haiti by providing the 
rural poor with the tools they need to lift themselves out of poverty.”45 On the other hand, Alex 
Conts, the current president of the Grameen Foundation, admitted that "Haiti is one of the most 
complicated environments for anyone to do business [italics mine].”46 As a country with severe 
infrastructural damage, low economic growth and poor state institutions, it therefore presents an 
opportunity for MFIs with a financial stability approach referenced above, which place 
sustainability over outreach and poverty-reduction, to gain momentum and credibility to 
fundraise substantial amounts from donors, philanthropists and state development agencies. But 
with such an exorbitant scale of interest rates, can microfinancial institutions really help and 
assist poverty-stricken Haitians amidst post-disaster reconstruction? As the investors 
transparency website www.mixmarket.org shows, the MFIs in Haiti are not lending to women to 
the low interest rates that are originally part of the scheme of microfinance. They still remain 
exorbitantly high and inconsistent with its principles: 
 
Table 1: Microfinance Rates in Haiti 
Institution Number of Borrowers Interest Rates 
Fondespoir N/A 54.17% 
SOGESOL N/A 53.14% 
MCN N/A 46.13% 
ACME 21,906 44.88% 
Fonkoze 15,866 31.85% 
 
 In the broader picture, articles like “Can Micro-Lending Save Haiti” in The New York 
Times place a high degree of hope and optimism that microfinance institutions can generate the 
type of growth, development and sustainability that is required in post-reconstruction 
development. For example, according to Philanthropy News Digest, 18% of microfinance clients 
have defaulted or at the risk of defaulting in Haiti, compared to the international rate of merely 
3%, coupled with a staggering $38 million in micro-credit loans that are outstanding in the 
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country.47 Therefore, although post-reconstruction development has played a significant role in 
recovery efforts, microfinance has not been the answer everyone expected. When the Grameen 
Bank was founded by Yunus in the 1970s, his goal was to keep differentiated interest rates 
between 10-15% of every loan. By issuing small loans, paying back these loans would not be a 
problem. However, as the institutions demonstrate, the need to emphasize the gains in social and 
human capital by women creates a discourse that hides the costs involved to create financial 
inclusion. 
There is a fundamental tension between the short-term social goals promised by 
microfinance and the long-term financial objectives of sustainability of investors. Although they 
promote democracy by increasing the extent of social and human capital, the financialization of 
microfinance continues unabated. These two contradictory logics of microfinance stand at odds 
and therefore should be investigated. In my next section, I will describe how and why human 
capital and social capital are emphasized in Haiti. More importantly, I will argue that they are 
used to mask the trappings of financial power that are being wielded by lenders.  
 
IV. The Two Contradictory Logics of Microfinance 
In its mission statement, the microfinancial institution Finca Haiti declares that 
“microfinance is an integral part of the relatively underdeveloped financial system.”48 
Correspondingly, the philanthropic Clinton-Bush Fund, which was established shortly after the 
earthquake, supports the mission of Finca Haiti on the ground. But it emphasizes to “help Haitian 
entrepreneurs, predominantly women, access the finance they need to develop their small and 
growing businesses, allowing them to support their families and communities.”49 This emphasis 
on the entrepreneurial woman is necessary for continuing the inclusion of poor subjects into 
grander financial markets. Microfinancial institutions justify their conversion into financial 
inclusion on various grounds. In the next section, I will describe based on the documents 
released by institutions like Fonkoze and AIDG how financial sustainability and increasing 
bankable clients are essential for these institutions to operate in Haiti.  
A. Investing in Profitable and Efficient Markets 
One of the best examples of financial inclusion is Fonkoze, the largest microfinancial 
institution operating in Haiti.50 Operating since 1994, Fonkoze, which calls itself “Haiti’s 
alternative Bank for the Organized Poor,” boasts up to 750 employees, 45,000 loan clients and 
up to 41 branches extended throughout the country. As proclaimed in its website, Fonkoze’s 
mission is to “provide Haiti’s poor with the financial and educational services they need to make 
their way out of poverty.” Fonkoze’s financial services for the poor include micro-lending, 
priced savings, remittance transfers, and currency conversion. Traditionally relegated and 
excluded, the bank has emphasized supporting the rural population of Haiti. For example, in an 
article written for a special report on Haiti sponsored by the Clinton Global Initiative, Fonkoze’s 
strategic analysts affirm that “Fonkoze found itself positioned to serve Haiti’s rural population 
before other banks were back on their feet.”51 As opposed to other development organizations, 
Fonkoze does not simply focus on Port-au-Prince. Its services are extended to “the rest of the 
country” in the rural communities “with far less economic activity.”52 This rural-urban divide is 
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of concern for the organization. Because banks have no interest in lending to poor women living 
in rural areas of Haiti, Fonkoze emphasizes its extended outreach and ability to connect with 
disempowered women.  
To calculate their clients for sustainability, MFIs make a distinction from the “bankable” 
and “economically active” poor from those who are “unbankable” and therefore useless for 
sustainable purposes.53 Although Fonkoze proclaims its social mission before its financial 
sustainability, it does not follow a cohesive posture. Fonkoze’s CEO, Anne Hastings, maintains 
that a “lack of sustainability is not a reason to close.” Yet later in the report she emphasizes the 
need for “sustainable business practices, a goal for which Fonkoze continually strives.”54 In a 
quote that echoes the concerns about financial sustainability, one of the investors of Fonkoze told 
Hastings, “You can’t open the branch in a place like without doing a market study first…you 
need to be sure that the branch can eventually become sustainable.” 
Furthermore, acknowledging that lending in the Haitian currency, the gourde, would not 
be profitable after borrowing in American dollars, Hastings states that “it doesn’t make sense to 
borrow in dollars and then lend in gourdes if by the time the gourdes are repaid they no longer 
have the same value.” She justifies Fonkoze’s acquired commercial license because “there was 
simply not enough capital to reach the scale that would be necessary to make the institution 
profitable” [emphasis mines]. After going through a process of commercialization for financial 
sustainability, Fonkoze changed its name to Finansye Fonkoze (SFF), which translates as 
Fonkoze Financial Services. Unlike its original vision, which did not depend on financial 
sustainability, the purpose of loans is to maximize financial returns by partaking “in the business 
of getting people out of poverty.” Fonkoze now offers insurance plans to protect micro-credit 
investments for lenders and borrowers. Its goal was not simply to issue microcredit, but more 
importantly to deliver other financial services, including savings and currency conversion that 
are seen as part of its institutional growth and greater reach: 
 
Other foundations and micro-credit institutions throughout the developing world have faced the 
same challenges of sustainability, scale, and capital. Prodem in Brazil, the Grameen Bank in 
Bangladesh, and CARD in the Philippines began as foundations and not-for-profits but had made 
the transition to full-fledged microcredit commercial banks.55 
 
Other microfinancial centers make their intentions to capitalize on investments more 
explicitly. State regulations on investment are considered a burden to the free market and private 
enterprise. Affirming the value of entrepreneurship at a smaller level, or what they call “micro-
entrepreneurship,” MFIs in Haiti like Société Générale Haitïenne de Solidarité (SOGESOL) 
affirm the need to maintain returns for their investment. As stated in their mission statement, 
SOGESOL seeks “to promote Haitian micro-entreneurship, to adapt traditional banking services 
to the micro-entrepreneurs needs, to satisfy the clientele while respecting efficiency and 
profitability standards” [emphasis mines].56 Other institutions like GCAP make it more clear 
what they mean by “efficiency and profitability standards”: 
By equitable we mean ensuring that the increasing commercial focus of microfinance, or ‘access to 
finance,’ doe not leave some poor people, regions or countries behind…and that sound business 
practices are respected. By efficiency we mean helping to make local financial systems operate 
more efficiently.57 
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The emphasis on efficiency is of great importance for microfinancial institutions. Whereas 
its earlier goals were geared toward delivery of services, its present focus on efficiency 
does not take into account whether its goals are compatible with those subjects it seeks to 
empower.  
B. Promoting Social Capital and Democracy 
In various instances, annual reports released by MFIs show a concern with either the 
education of their constituencies, their staff members or the role of education in fostering a 
democratic society. More importantly, although the recipients of microfinance have the ability to 
borrow micro-loans, the words and expressions that are routinely used connote that these poor 
women are fundamentally entrepreneurial but ignorant about economics. For example, Denis 
O’Brien, the chairman of the privately-owned Digicel Group, states in one of the reports for the 
Global Clinton Initiative that Haitians are “poorly educated” and lack the opportunities for 
“income generation.”58 O’Brien further argues that Haiti’s problems are “over-analyzed” and that 
the “reasons behind each of these problems may be complex.”59 These “over-analyzed” problems 
include issues as distinct and unassociated as weak political leadership, lack of food security, 
poor education, poor access to healthcare, violence, and environmental degradation. O’Brien also 
states that Haiti has an “enviable market access” and a “young population” that can elicit the 
“international will” that is necessary to overcome its current problems. Yet, O’Brien startlingly 
ignores Haiti’s history of foreign interventions, its half a century of recurrent dictatorships, and 
the beleaguered position it has assumed for the past two decades. O’Brien assumes that Haiti has 
fair and equal conditions for international trade, when clearly from its case of rice and pigs with 
the United States, this is absolutely not the case. Finally, O’Brien triumphantly announces that 
“making sure the private sector is at the forefront of redevelopment efforts is the key,” assuming 
that the culture of dependency he decries will somehow vanish or peter out through ongoing 
foreign direct investment initiatives. All this points to the lack of recognition that analysts put to 
the role that international organizations have and continue to play in Haiti’s socio-economic 
development.  
In the case of Fonkoze, which seeks to provide the “educational services they [Haitians] 
need to make their way out of poverty,” they assert that Haitians “know nothing about organizing 
economically” and traditionally have “no control over the economy.”60 This even more evident 
with Fonkoze’s hiring practices. The literacy requirement is implicitly tailed toward those in 
Port-au-Prince: “Fonkoze seeks to hire employees who are literate; that is, they can read and 
write confidently in Haitian Creole.”61   
The use of creole itself is used in many of the organization’s programs. For example, 
Fonkoze explains to its clients, particularly women, that the organization is driven by the desire 
to eradicate lamizè, the misery of poverty. To illustrate this, in its 2010 annual report, the 
“Staircase out of Poverty” presents a hierarchy of regaining one’s humanity by escaping out of 
poverty. Part of this hierarchy involves stepping out of abject poverty to attain the means of 
entrepreneurial dexterity. Fonkoze begins by providing education services (ti kredi) to health 
services (chemen lavi miyo).  
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Figure 1: The Staircase Out of Poverty 
 
Its focus, then, becomes the individual, not the structural and political conditions that 
have led to poverty all around. “We believe that for Haiti to develop sustainably, we need to 
apply the same thinking we use in developed nations,” asserts Catherine Lainè, the Deputy 
Director of the Appropriate Infrastructure Development Group (AIDG).62 In order “To Build a 
Better Haiti,” the title of Lainè’s report, developing institutions “need to invest in human capital 
and long-term business development.”63 The entrepreneurial subject, in the “staircase out of 
poverty,” not only borrows but invests in “the small and medium enterprise sector.” To appeal to 
these clients, Fonkoze created new financial products such as “hot credit” lines of expediency, 
disbursed after only 3 months. Laine’s assumptions, in substance, start with her opposition to 
what she considers unnecessary and burdensome regulations to private enterprise, and its 
undermining effect on Haitians skills, knowledge and experience.  
The focus on the concept of human capital is a remarkable feature of millennial 
development that sets it apart from its practices in the mid-20th century. Whereas the focus of the 
World Bank and other financial institutions were tribes, communities or entire societies, 
millennial development focuses on increasing the possibilities for the individual to maximize his 
or her human capital. In economic thought, the concept of human capital was popularized by 
Gary Becker from the Chicago School of Economics.64 Becker defined it as the bundle of skills, 
knowledge and abilities inherited or acquired by the individual in modern capitalist production. It 
is possessed and inseparable from the subject. Through his concept, Becker radical extended 
economic analysis to the domains of society that were previously outside of the market and 
studied by sociologists. By extending human capital to labor, a concept previously theorized as a 
passive factor of production in its relation to land and capital, Becker sought to re-conceptualize 
economic capital in its totality.  
Various authors writing for the publications of microfinance emphasize the abundant 
human capital that exists in Haiti. Under conditions of poverty, human capital is wasted, they 
argue, because it is no longer used. As Roy remarked, the subject of poverty is seen as “dead 
capital” that is rich in assets that can alternatively be converted into economic capital and 
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financial capital: “The ‘mystery of capital’ is how such dormant and defective assets can be 
transformed into liquid capital, thereby unleashing new frontiers of capital accumulation.”65 In 
the case of Haiti, this concept of human capital abounds. In a Clinton Global Initiative report 
aptly titled “Haiti’s Potential Waiting to be Fulfilled,” O’Brien laments the “huge untapped 
potential” to exercise and make use of human capital.66 The young population is ready to work, 
O’Brien argues. Its human capital is waiting to be exercised. This young population represents “a 
large latent labor force of energetic, diligent, and committed workers who have the enthusiasm 
and optimism to bring their country forward.”67 The World Bank would concur with that 
statement. In the line of publications that have been published after the earthquake, The World 
Bank diagnoses the problems of poverty in relation to its low human capital:  
Although both women and men face poverty-induced difficulties due to limited human and 
financial capital, women face greater obstacles. In Haitian agriculture in particular, it is widely 
recognized that gender is the primary influence on the division of labor and employment prospects 
[emphasis mine].68 
 
In a similar fashion, Lainè observes some of the troublesome and unmanageable issues that have 
affected Haiti can be solved by investing in entrepreneurs. These are difficult but malleable 
problems, however. As financial operations like AIDG can aid these entrepreneurs by investing 
in the facilities that are necessary to generate and flourish this squandering dead capital: “Many 
would-be entrepreneurs or star-ups in developing countries that aim to effect positive social c 
change often flounder because they lack the business skills, technical skills, networks and capital 
to survive in the hostile business environments of their home countries.”69 Microfinance opens 
the possibilities for attaining these goals, as the worth recipient of micro-loans is one who can 
acquire and maximize his/her human capital and build on the spirit of entrepreneurship.  
This tragedy of “untapped potential” of human capital reflects the potential for the 
realization of some unfulfilled but attainable progress that is at the core of development. It worth 
pointing out that this realization is built directly with the individual, not through the state. As 
Roy put it, “microfinance writes out the role of the state and instead focuses on the creativity of 
poor entrepreneurs and the success of local institutions in enabling such entrepreneurship.”70 
Because the state impedes the free circuit of capital under markets, it is bracketed out as a 
method for achieving progress, especially in sites of post-disaster reconstruction. 
The concept of social capital has not only been instrumental in the discipline of sociology 
to understand relations in society. In development, the World Bank uses it in its programs to 
denote the links between development aid and the growth of civil society. As stated in the World 
Bank’s website, “social capital, when enhanced in a positive manner, can improve project 
effectiveness and sustainability by building the community’s capacity to work together to 
address their common needs, fostering greater inclusion and cohesion, and increasing 
transparency and accountability.”71 In its relation to economic development, civil society now 
signifies the ties that escape the market but that are important to build cohesion and progress. 
Thus, “social capital can be conceptualized as a remedy for market failure, as a non-economic 
‘glue’ that holds societies together,” as Roy argues. 72  
 
C. Illustration: Fonkoze’s Solidarity Centers 
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 Using the genealogical method of his later works, Foucault effectively argued that in 
order to understand how power relations function in society, the specific sites under which they 
operate are important for a critical analysis. Therefore, isolating these “meticulous rituals of 
power,” as Foucault called them, enabled him to undertake the discourse analysis that is 
necessary “to localize and specify how power works, what it does and how it does it,” in the 
words of his American intelocutors.73 As they put it, “the rules and obligations which emerge 
from these rituals are inscribed in civil law, in moral codes, in the universal laws of humanity 
that claim to temper and prevent the violence that would supposedly exist without their civilizing 
constraints.”74 
  In the workings of microfinance, we can see how these “meticulous rituals of power” 
take place. International development institutions such as the World Bank maintain that social 
capital is a vital component for development writ large. On a micro-level, Fonkoze applies the 
concept of social capital through its “solidarity centers.” Fonkoze’s solidarity centers are 
considered the seeds of a new democratic structures – and a new democratic political culture – 
for the future. Unlike commercial banks, Fonkoze provides small loans to small female vendors 
in the countryside, or ti machann. Whereas commercial banks provide large loans, Fonkoze 
focuses on small loans and group lending. In this group, each loan recipient is grouped with four 
other women to form a “Solidarity Group.” Each Solidarity Group, in turn, is aggregated with 6-
10 other solidarity groups to form a “Solidarity Center.” The Solidarity Centers “meet near 
client’s homes for loan disbursement, repayment, education, and solidarity meetings.” All these 
financial services, according to Hastings, contribute to a “tremendously powerful sense of 
community.” But the Solidarity Centers are not just a vehicle for community empowerment. 
According to Hastings, they are “a truly democratic institution.”75  Upholding the tradition of 
representative democracy in Western liberalism, members form regional assemblies where they 
vote for representatives for a national assembly located in the capital, Port-au-Prince. For 
Fonkoze, the Solidarity Centers are capable of enacting something that the state is unable to 
achieve. Hastings explains the formal rules and procedures that animate its democratic ethos:  
Each center selects a chief who represents it at caucuses for the entire branch. These branch-wide 
caucuses elect representatives to a national assembly that meets once a year in Port-au-Prince and, 
among other functions, elects a minority of the Fonkoze Board of Directors. 
Though social capital is the “glue” that builds Haiti after the earthquake, this reliance on 
social capital is deployed for ulterior reasons. Social capital is consistent with the logic of 
profitability because it reassures investors that their loans will be paid with a higher interest rate 
than promised. In other words, social capital reassures those who financialize microfinancial 
institutions that there will not be a high and broad risk of default by the lenders. By including 
women in groups as borrowers, what institutions like Fonkoze do is to create a de facto form of 
collateral in case one of them defaults. Although microfinance is based in the absence of 
collateral forms of guarantee, the Solidarity Centers offset this problem and minimize the risk of 
loan defaults. It only leads microfinance institutions to deal with groups instrumentally, since it 
reduces administrative costs while creating opportunities for motivating repayments. The 
objective is not to recognize the political divisions and inequalities that exist at large in Haiti, but 
to depoliticize these historical practices in order to create avenues for repayment that are more 
feasible, less time-consuming and more effective. As the geographer Katherine Rankin put it, 
“Donors thus consider microfinance to be a ‘win-win’ approach to development because 
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investors can mobilize bonding social capital to enhance the financial viability of banking with 
poor women, and poor women gain access to both social and financial resources that allow them 
to help themselves through the market mechanism.”76 This de facto forms of collateral are 
significant because they contradict the values and democratic élan of microfinance, since women 
are grouped together as a way of governing and maintaining control over their investments. 
 Indeed, women constitute the vast majority of recipients of microfinance. The 
empowerment of women is itself a discourse that has permeated the workings of microfinance 
since its inception. For example, the entire 15,866 recipients of microloans from Fonkoze are 
women. Similarly, Finca Haiti states in their website that “our average client is a married woman 
with 3-7 children, who sells food stuffs, cookware, charcoal, used clothings, or soft drinks in a 
local market near her home.”77 The poor, vulnerable woman is representative of the ideal subject 
of microfinance. Although she lacks education, she is well-equipped to become an entrepreneur 
and future investor. The gendered subject of microfinance reflects the idea of The Third World 
Woman that developing institutions such as the World Bank have been stressing in their 
operations. She can build human capital and increase her social capital, while at the same time 
build solidarity links with other women to represent the success of microfinancial operations.78 
Despite this obvious focus on women, the “hidden transcript” of microfinance omits that the 
differentiated interest rates of its focus have not changed.  
To ensure profitable and efficient markets, microfinancial institutions insist on the 
freedom of its borrowers to dispose of their small loans as they wish. But as demonstrated by the 
Solidarity Centers and the use of de facto forms of collateral for poor women, these forms of 
participatory democracy do not advance any tangible political rights or liberties but merely 
ensures the governance of its borrowers. The contradictory logics of microfinance are clearly 
seen in Haiti through the workings of Fonkoze, Finca Haiti and other microfinancial institutions. 
The differentiated interest rates that have thrived under microfinancial schemes can only 
continue to exist insofar as the discourses of human and social capital are employed. Because 
human capital and social capital enjoy such unqualified support by Northern development 
agencies such as the GCAP, the creation of entrepreneurial subjects who possess the freedom to 
invest and subsist on their own is vital for the development project of microfinance. More 
importantly, these entrepreneurial subjects are consistent with the neoliberal vision of 
undermining the state by guaranteeing the “self-reliance” and “ingenuity” of individual citizens 
who the passive consumers conceptualized by homo economicus instead of political subjects 
with control over their own affairs and livelihood.  
VI. Conclusion 
 
  In this article, I examined how the discourse of microfinance is centered on poverty as its 
structure of knowledge while governing microfinancial clients by controlling their conduct. In 
order to understand this discourse and its continuing appeal, I drew on Foucault’s conceptual 
schema of discourse, power and governmentality.  
First, I located this discourse in its social-historical conditions, and emphasized its effects 
of the production and reproduction of knowledge. Second, I used Foucault’s concept of power as 
a productive force instead of a static, linear and repressive force. Third, I used Foucault’s 
concept of governmentality as the art of governing outside the bounds of state and political 
institutions. In the final analysis, the conceptual schema of discourse, power and governmentality 
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allows me to re-think microfinance as a discourse of development that treats the poor as an 
object of knowledge and social capital as its central organizing principle.  
There are two levels that one needs to understand about the discourse of microfinance: a 
conceptual level and empirical level. At a conceptual level, microfinance is founded on two 
contradictory logics of financial sustainability and socio-economic development. First, the logic 
of financial sustainability includes prospects for growth, profitability and the expansion of 
unregulated markets that can be directed precisely at poor populations. Second, the logic of 
socio-economic development is hinged upon the idea of empowering women, strengthening 
social and human capital and promoting participatory democracy at the local and national level. 
In this article, I explored how these discourses operate and whether they enter into conversation 
with one another. More importantly, I focused on what these discourses do and the effects they 
create, rather than focusing on the truth or falsity of these discourses. 
At an empirical level, microfinancial initiatives have been implemented across a wide 
array of developing nations. In the 21st century, microfinancial initiatives currently operate 
throughout Latin America and the Caribbean, including in the poorest nation in the Western 
Hemisphere, Haiti. In Haiti, microfinancial initiatives play a role in how microfinance is 
interpreted by clients. But what remains puzzling about Haiti is that microfinancial initiatives are 
radically reconfiguring family and community relations, a realm that is usually consigned to civil 
society and left untouched by the state.  
One example of this reconfiguration is the large initiative Fonkoze. Fonkoze forces its 
clients in rural communities to strengthen the social capital in towns by forming Solidarity 
Centers. However, by forcing its clients to organize collectively in Solidarity Centers, Fonkoze 
creates a de facto form of collateral in case one of the clients defaults. Although the idea of 
microfinance excludes collateral forms of guarantee, the solidarity centers offset this problem 
and minimize the risk of loan defaults. These collateral forms of guarantee are significant 
because they contradict the values and democratic spirit of microfinance, since women are 
grouped together as a way of governing and maintaining control over their investments.  
All in all, this analysis of microfinance in Haiti complicates the primordial discourse of 
aid and development. In substance, development in Haiti no longer simply comes packaged in 
the form of “aid.” Neither is it merely exercised through the elimination of tariffs or the creation 
of export-processing zones. Instead, development in the form of microfinance is considered an 
investment in human and social capital that will lead to free and entrepreneurial individuals with 
the potential to thrive independently of state interference. As evidenced in Haiti, this form of 
development is creating new forms of governance that are unaccountable, undemocratic and 
potentially unsustainable.   
A discourse analysis of primary documents of key microfinancial institution will reveal 
these same discourses at work. As argued above, through the trappings of human capital and 
social capital, microfinance is clothed behind the veils of democratic development, yet its spread 
and maintenance depends on the production and reproduction of financial markets based on 
unattainable interest rates and a culture of dependency between the borrower and the lender. This 
relationship between the political rationality of democracy and financial markets is captured in 
microfinance in a manner unseen with other projects of development. For this reason, it remains 
vital to continue to investigate the breadth and depth of microfinance in other sites. But insofar 
as its logic depends on other discourses, the popularity of microfinance must be gauged carefully 
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and put to the test of whether or not it advances or prevents the interests of its borrowers and the 
well-being of populations. It makes no sense to speak of “development” if that is not the case.  
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